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Transformation or Substitution?  
The Workers’ Party and the Right in  
Northeast Brazil 
Jorge Antonio Alves 
Abstract: One of the most significant recent changes in Brazilian politics 
is the inroads made by the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 
PT) and other leftist parties into state and municipal governments in the 
country’s most conservative region, the Northeast. An important strand 
of literature argues that this is due to a transformative strategy anchored 
in institutional growth, which is based on opening local party direc-
torates. In contrast, this analysis shows that the PT has made gains in the 
region by segmenting its strategy – that is, by focusing on two well-
established political practices. First, the PT has leveraged executive office 
at higher levels of government (e.g., federal and state) in order to ad-
vance at lower levels (e.g., state and municipal). Second, it has construct-
ed pragmatic alliances with opportunistic parties, thus revealing how the 
migration of opportunist politicians into allied parties allowed en-
trenched elites to remain in power. This suggests that the Left’s subna-
tional advances are less transformative than they seem and could poten-
tially harm democratic consolidation. 
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Introduction 
After over a decade of sustained electoral hegemony, the tables turned 
rather quickly for Brazil’s Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 
PT).1 Following the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as president in 
2002, the PT experienced a long electoral boom culminating in the elec-
tion of Dilma Rousseff as Lula’s successor despite her lack of electoral 
experience. The PT also expanded subnationally in the less economically 
developed and historically conservative Northeast, the region where it 
had been weakest. Despite its early victories being tied to its historical 
base in the South and Southeast, the PT’s later successes through Lula 
(2006) and Rousseff (2010 and 2014) relied heavily on northeastern vot-
ers (Hunter and Power 2007; Soares and Teron 2008; Alves and Hunter 
2017). PT downticket candidates in the Northeast also saw improved 
results, with the party’s shares of federal deputies and state legislators 
growing from 6.6 percent to 16.6 percent and from 6.2 percent to 12.3 
percent, respectively, during the period 1998–2010.2 Notably, the PT 
also secured executive positions, such as its first ever governors and an 
increasing share of mayors (10.2 percent in 2012 versus 1.2 percent in 
2000). However, after narrowly winning reelection in 2014, President 
Rousseff was impeached by a legislature led by former coalition allies 
from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento 
Democrático Brasileiro, PMDB) and the Centrão (“big center”), an ag-
glomeration of centrist and rightist parties.3 Following Rousseff’s im-
peachment, the PT had 60 percent fewer mayors elected in the 2016 
municipal elections than in the 2012 polls. The party also contested 35 
percent fewer municipal elections as many incumbent mayors had aban-
doned ship. Although such opportunistic behavior is commonplace in 
Brazil (Desposato 2006; Novaes 2018), the scholarly consensus was that 
                                                 
1  Thanks go to Frances Hagopian, Peter Johannessen, Eduardo Moncada, Timo-
thy Power, Celina Souza, Kurt Weyland, and three anonymous reviewers. Extra 
special thanks to Wendy Hunter. An earlier version of this paper was presented 
at the 2017 LASA Annual Congress. I am grateful to Queens College and a 
PSC-CUNY research grant for financial support. 
2  Unless otherwise referenced, the electoral statistics presented are the result of 
the author’s calculations based on data from the online repository of the Brazil-
ian electoral authority (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, TSE), online: <www.tse. 
jus.br>.  
3  The PMDB recently reverted its acronym to MDB, as part of a broader process 
of rebranding that saw many dropping the term Party (Partido) from their offi-
cial name. I adopt the convention of using the official name during the time pe-
riod being referenced.  
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the PT was uniquely built to prevent this. So how did the wheels come 
off so abruptly? 
To better understand the PT’s rise and apparent rapid decline, I ex-
amine the methods it employed to expand subnationally. It is well estab-
lished that the party’s early successes stemmed from its iconoclastic ap-
proach to politicking (Keck 1992), particularly its emphasis on pro-
grammatic leftist positions, tight party discipline, and the rejection of 
pragmatic alliances. The PT grew by building a strong brand with loyal 
support in southern Brazil, which it did by advocating good governance 
and an innovative agenda of social programs and inclusive participation 
– known as the “PT way of governing” (Bittar 1992). Lula’s election, 
however, followed significant adaptations (e.g., softening of ideology and 
using professionalized campaigns) that aimed to increase the PT’s elec-
toral viability beyond its original base (Amaral 2003; Samuels 2004; 
Hunter 2010; Singer 2012; Ribeiro 2014). But the greatest change in the 
PT’s growth strategy came after it took national office and then began to 
expand into the Northeast Region by leveraging the prerogatives and 
resources of executive office at the national level to build pragmatic 
alliances. These new allies were increasingly heterogeneous and thus 
raised the costs of maintaining the president’s (and governors’) coalition 
(Bertholini and Pereira 2017), which ultimately cost the PT its transfor-
mational project.  
This argument has been at least partially challenged by a strand of 
literature that ties the PT’s northeastern expansion to a return to its dis-
tinctive process of local-level party-building (Samuels and Zucco 2014; 
Van Dyck 2014; Van Dyck and Montero 2015). In this account the PT 
national leadership allocated windfall resources for party organization in 
rural areas where conservative elites were strongest. Support from loyal 
partisans – supposedly formed by these new local directorates – led to 
the defeat of entrenched northeastern elites. The implication is that the 
PT did more than just win elections; it also transformed the very nature 
of politics in the region. In contrast, we argue that the PT did not utilize 
a transformational approach but rather merely substituted actors at the 
top of political structures, which remained mostly unchanged. In short, 
the PT appropriated and co-opted preexisting elites and won in the 
Northeast by learning how to play by the de facto rules of everyday poli-
tics in Brazil. 
Programmatic parties, which are based on a coherent set of ideolog-
ical and policy precepts, face a specific dilemma as they seek to grow 
(Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Strøm 1990; Kitschelt 1994; Müller and 
Strøm 1999): Should they continue to coherently emphasize their central 
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ideas or relax them to prioritize winning office? If they choose the latter 
(as the PT did), they are likely to need to adapt how they reach out to 
voters – Kitschelt (2000) calls this “party–voter linkages.”4 In large fed-
eral systems with significant socioeconomic differences, such as Brazil, 
linkage strategies are further constrained by varying regional needs, ex-
pectations, and informal political practices (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; 
Behrend and Whitehead 2016). Therefore, parties must segment strate-
gies by adopting different linkages across groups and regions (Kitschelt 
2000; Luna 2014). The PT won elections in the Northeast by successfully 
and pragmatically segmenting its strategies. However, in facing the signif-
icant and resilient informal practices of northeastern politics, the party 
made choices that saw it normalize itself and diminish its transformative 
project.  
Parties require some degree of pragmatism in order to go from be-
ing the ideological fringe to the substantive opposition; that is even more 
so the case when they become incumbents, regardless of whether they 
are primarily policy- or office-seeking parties. Nevertheless, the extent 
and forms of the PT’s normalization have important implications. When 
we consider that the PT succeeded by playing the northeastern “politics 
as usual” game of executive alignment and directing resources to oppor-
tunistic allies (both of which are effective strategies for delivering elec-
toral victories when in control of resources but not for building lasting 
allegiances), it is unsurprising that the PT has suffered since losing the 
presidency. Not only does this approach affect the party and its distinc-
tive brand (Lupu 2013), it also potentially delegitimizes the leftist plat-
form across Latin America, thus opening up leftist political and socioec-
onomic inclusive policies to challenge and retrenchment (Dunning and 
Novaes forthcoming). Further, in embracing the strategies (if not quite 
the policy positions) of political opportunists, the PT might have re-
versed the institutionalization trend of posttransition Brazilian democra-
cy, exhausting coalitional presidentialism and dealigning the party system 
like leftists who adopted neoliberal reforms did earlier across Latin 
America (Roberts 2014). 
This study focuses on the nine states in Brazil’s Northeast in order 
to challenge the notion that the PT expanded by building resilient parti-
san linkages. Subnational analysis is an established strategy to examine 
the validity of national-level theories on subnational phenomena (Gi-
raudy, Moncada and Snyder Forthcoming). Competing research (Samuels 
                                                 
4  Kitschelt’s typology includes charismatic, clientelistic, and programmatic link-
ages (Kitschelt 2000: 855). 
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and Zucco 2014; Van Dyck 2014; Van Dyck and Montero 2015) uses the 
Northeast as a “hard test” of partisanship-based explanations due its 
history of machine politics and political competition dominated by con-
servative elites (Ames 2001) and its socioeconomic profile, which would 
make the PT’s urban-based mobilizational strategy difficult (Montero 
2012). By analyzing political trends in the northeastern states within 
regional and federal contexts, we can downplay the role of partisanship 
in recent electoral shifts and stress the importance of regionally specific 
informal political practices. This article highlights the importance of 
analyzing state-level politics to understand the role of traditional subna-
tional elites in national and subnational political outcomes, especially in 
Brazil (Hagopian 1996; Souza 1997; Abrúcio 1998; Samuels 2003). 
Knowledge about northeastern politics is also relevant in and of itself: 
the region’s 53 million residents account for 28 percent of Brazilians, 
which would also make it Latin America’s third most populous country. 
The region’s considerably sized electorate delivered victories to the last 
few presidents, while its large congressional delegation has been able to 
appoint its politicians to prominent brokerage positions in Brasília, as 
recent corruption scandals illustrate. 
Part one of this article describes everyday politics in Brazil’s North-
east and establishes the expectations of conduct for a party hoping to 
win office there. Part two introduces recent studies that emphasize the 
salience of the novel organizational strategy – namely, the establishment 
of local directories designed to create PT partisans – behind the PT’s 
growth. Part three underscores the broader political dynamics in which 
this PT strategy unfolded, highlighting two conventional methods that 
the PT has adopted: leveraging the benefits of executive office down-
ward (from the president to governors to mayors) and forging electoral 
and governing alliances with opportunistic nonleftist parties. Inflating 
the governing coalition by accepting and even welcoming party-switch-
ing ensured the PT had the electoral support of mayors of small finan-
cially dependent municipalities across the region, which is one of the 
prime benefits of incumbency. Part four concludes by drawing attention 
to a catch in the PT’s growth strategy: a party can only remain dominant 
to the extent that it governs. Once a political group loses the executive 
and can no longer distribute resources, its opportunistic network disinte-
grates as members defect in search of new patrons. Indeed, under the 
new patronage of the PT, incumbent politics remained alive in north-
eastern Brazil.  
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Politics in Brazil and the Northeast 
Brazil is a presidential democracy with a three-tiered federal system con-
sisting of 26 states, a federal district, and 5,570 municipalities. Voters 
elect chief executives (president, governors, and mayors) and legislators 
(senators and federal deputies, state deputies, and city councilors) at each 
tier. Presidents, governors, and mayors of municipalities with popula-
tions greater than 200,000 are chosen in majoritarian elections; a run-off 
is held if no candidate achieves a majority. Mayors in the 97 percent of 
municipalities below this population threshold are elected through the 
plurality rule. Legislators are elected through open-list proportional rep-
resentation with states and municipalities serving as districts. Federal and 
state representatives are voted for in general elections every four years, as 
are municipal representatives in midterm elections.  
Brazil has a weakly institutionalized, highly fragmented multiparty 
system, which partly results from the concatenation of a presidential 
system, electoral rules, the prominent position of subnational elites in 
national-level party decision-making, and lax barriers to party-switching 
(Mainwaring 1999; Desposato 2006; Carneiro and Almeida 2008; Samu-
els and Shugart 2010).5 Most political parties are ideologically diffuse, 
fragmented, and somewhat disarticulated across territorial levels. It is 
common for national-level allies to compete at the subnational level and 
for state-level and especially local-level candidates to break party lines 
and side with national-level opponents.6  
Despite systemic conditions that complicate coordination, the fates 
of a party’s executive and legislative candidates are interdependent within 
and across levels of government. Without strong parties to contain them, 
politicians respond first and foremost to the availability of public re-
sources, such as discretionary transfers and political appointments within 
the bureaucracy. The presidency is the cornerstone of this structure. The 
federal executive is powerful due to its ability to shape policy and is re-
source-rich compared to its subnational units. In Brazil the president has 
an outsize influence – that is, the president has strong legislative powers, 
has final say over budgetary disbursements, and makes a comparatively 
                                                 
5  The judiciary branch attempted to curtail party-switching in 2007 by determin-
ing that elected positions belong to the party rather than the individual, but the 
decision was revoked for executives in 2015 (Novaes 2018). 
6  Historically, the PT was the exception, but that is no longer the case. The party 
entered 178 alliances with the PMDB in the 2016 municipal elections despite 
the PMDB being the protagonist in Rousseff’s impeachment (Folha de São Paulo 
2016a). 
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large number of appointments that permeate the bureaucracy, culminat-
ing in national ministerships (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000; Cheibub, 
Figueiredo and Limongi 2009). 
The national executive must coordinate a delicate, intricate system 
of political interests to ensure legislative support. Presidents in multiparty 
democracies typically borrow strategies from parliamentary systems 
when distributing cabinet posts as trade chips in order to build congres-
sional majorities – something the literature dubs “coalitional presidential-
ism” (Abranches 1998; Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power 2018). Depend-
ing on macroeconomic conditions and compositional factors (e.g., pro-
portionality and ideological heterogeneity), coalitional maintenance costs 
can be quite high, thus impacting cabinet size, ministry expenditure lev-
els, and the availability of pork for legislators (Bertholini and Pereira 
2017). In federal systems, where representatives are linked to subnational 
constituencies, cabinet distribution must also weigh up territorial consid-
erations, thus linking national and local politics. 
Subnational executives are also key players in Brazil’s highly decen-
tralized federal system. State governors are influential actors within state 
politics due to their control of sizeable resources and because they face 
fewer restrictions on distributional choices and weaker institutional 
checks and balances (Souza 1997; Abrúcio 1998; Samuels 2003; Carneiro 
and Almeida 2008). Although their freedoms have been significantly 
curtailed by constitutional reforms limiting spending, governors still 
possess relatively large budgets compared to most of their municipal 
counterparts. Added to their visibility and organizational backing, gover-
nors are active figures in campaigns within their states, influencing sub-
national elections on behalf of their parties and allies (Ferreira and Buga-
rin 2007; Dantas 2009). Controlling governorships is valuable to national 
executives and nongoverning parties seeking to remain nationally rele-
vant (Borges, Alballa, and Burtnik 2017). State executives can leverage 
their influence over state legislators and their vote-getting networks to 
secure concessions from presidents, such as ministerial appointments for 
their lieutenants and resources for discretionary spending. They exploit 
these links to strengthen their hold on their states, exerting what Gibson 
(2013) calls “boundary control.” As a result, a party’s ability to expand in 
a state is made significantly easier by winning the governorship. 
Mayors are also important actors in Brazil’s multilevel system. Bra-
zilian municipalities, one of the few in the world recognized as inde-
pendent members of the union, received significant responsibilities fol-
lowing redemocratization, including the power to draft social policy 
(notably on primary health and basic education), the freedom to deter-
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mine property and sales taxes, and substantial leeway in deciding how to 
target spending. Continued interaction and local knowledge allow 
mayors to develop steady relationships with voters, making them power-
ful brokers who can control access to local voters for their parties, coali-
tions, or even the highest bidder (Avelino, Biderman, and Baroni 2012; 
Novaes 2018). Collectively, mayors are essential for the consolidation of 
political power in a state and are therefore an important part of state 
elites’ and national elites’ electoral calculus. 
Politically independent but generally strapped for cash, mayors are 
typically the most pragmatic actors in Brazilian politics. Most municipali-
ties are reliant on mandated federal transfers for the majority of their 
revenue (Afonso and Araujo 2000) and voluntary transfers, such as legis-
lative budgetary amendments and partnerships with federal ministries 
(convênios), to fund new programs (Arretche 2009).7 Securing these re-
sources requires municipal representatives to apply for federal and state 
programs and to pursue one-on-one meetings with decision-makers 
within ministries to expedite those requests. State and federal legislators 
traverse and connect the levels of government by directing their allotted 
budgetary amendments to their constituencies, finding additional fund-
ing opportunities for municipalities at higher levels, and coaxing favors 
from governors and presidents in exchange for amassing electoral sup-
port from mayors in their regions and legislative support in assemblies. 
Consequently, mayors, especially those in smaller and economically stag-
nant municipalities, are reliant on and responsive to the group currently 
holding power and resources. 
As a result of these structures and needs, there are significant incen-
tives and pressures to strategically channel public resources to affect 
subnational elections. Incumbents therefore direct partnerships and 
investments to benefit copartisans and allies at the expense of their 
competitors (Ferreira and Bugarin 2007; Brollo and Nannicini 2012; 
Johannessen 2016). Politicians commonly make these claims during 
election years, either by touting copartisan upper-ballot candidates or by 
praising the benefits of alliances (Alves and Hunter 2017).8  
                                                 
7  On average, municipalities raise only 6 percent of total tax revenue in Brazil 
(RF/CETAD 2013). This ranks Brazil’s municipalities 15th out of a sample of 
19 federal systems (Afonso and Araújo 2000).  
8  Political channeling of resources transcends the Brazilian context. Studies 
highlight similar behavior in other federal systems in Latin America (Gervasoni 
2010; Lema and Streb 2013; Flamand and Moscovitch 2014; González 2016), 
India (Arulampalam et al. 2009) and consolidated democracies such as the US 
and Spain (e.g., Grossman 1994; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2008). 
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Everyday politics in Brazil – especially in regions that rely on the 
transfer of resources, such as the Northeast – is characterized by the 
tendency of groups to have successive electoral victories, working their 
way down from the federal level to the state level and then to the local 
level (“leveraging”). This pattern suggests that party leaders make use of 
the institutional, financial, and political resources at their disposal and of 
the visibility enjoyed by higher levels of government to reward and ex-
pand their networks. It is also typified by parties entering into ideologi-
cally diverse, pragmatic alliances with centrist or nonprogrammatic par-
ties, which in Brazil have been referred to as “professional support par-
ties” (Power 2000). These parties’ main reason for being is to exchange 
legislative support in return for pork. This practice is reproduced at the 
state level, where parties informally cluster around incumbents and form 
incongruous political constellations with little else in common but the 
joint desire for the spoils of power. In Brazil this tendency to flock to 
the party that controls resources has been called situacionismo (Hagopian 
1996: 181) or governismo (Leal 1976; Abrúcio 1998). Leveraging precedes 
and subsidizes alliance-making – particularly the opportunistic type – but 
is conceptually distinct. Leveraging national office could conceivably be 
deployed as part of a medium-term transformational strategy if it ex-
pands not only the party’s electoral success but also jump-starts party-
building by coherently strengthening the party’s program and subsidizing 
programmatic alliances. But when it is used to buy the allegiance (and 
voter networks) of opportunistic regional and local elites, it replicates 
and maintains everyday forms of politics and typically results in rapid 
shifts in subnational voting patterns following a change of power at 
higher levels of government. 
Historically, northeastern elites became entrenched by expertly con-
trolling the boundary between national and state politics (table 1). De-
spite local variation, these states all had local groups who used their local 
power bases to become politically relevant nationally, bartered their sup-
port for national-level resources, and then leveraged these resources to 
secure greater control of state and local politics, thus becoming central 
nodes for a variety of pragmatic local allies. Antônio Carlos Magalhães 
cemented his group’s dominant position in Bahia between 1991 and 
2006. Former president José Sarney (1985–1989) exploited his time in 
office to secure similar control of his home state of Maranhão (Power 
n.d.), where his group elected five consecutive governors – one with 81 
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percent of the vote – while controlling 55–78 percent of mayors. Long 
spells of dominance also occurred in Ceará, Paraíba, and Sergipe.9  
Table 1. Dominant Political Groups in Brazil’s Northeast, 1982–2010  
State (Group)  
19
82
 
19
86
 
19
90
 
19
94
 
19
98
 
20
02
 
20
06
 
20
10
 
Maranhão (Sarney)                
Bahia (Magalhães)                
Ceará (Jereissati)                
Paraíba (Cunha Lima)                
Pernambuco (Arraes/Campos)                
Sergipe (Alves)                
Note:  Shaded cells represent governors from a group with more than three terms 
(direct support and/or familial relationship). The hashed line indicates the first 
election where the PT was the national incumbent. 
Source:  Authors calculation based on data from the TSE (2016) and Nicolau (n.d.) 
The apparent invincibility of northeastern political machines was only 
partially based on entrenched support. Their survival hinged first and 
foremost on their ability to continue to serve as guarantors of federal 
resources. The elites in four northeastern states perfected this formula in 
the 1990s and were able to enhance their standing in their home states by 
bulking up the support coalitions for Presidents José Sarney (1985–
1989), Fernando Collor (1990–1992), Itamar Franco (1992–1994), and 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002). The PT’s maiden presidential 
victory in 2002 temporarily upset this system, as the first Lula admin-
istration changed spending priorities and political appointees within the 
federal bureaucracy, thus shifting the flow of resources and leaving ma-
chines dry. Suddenly, governors used to distributing a healthy flow of 
federal resources could no longer deliver funds to cash-hungry munici-
palities or claim credit for federal programs. Mayors and legislators began 
to look for new patrons. As a result, Lula’s reelection campaign estab-
lished the PT and its allies as the dominant force in northeastern politics, 
winning the governorship of old bailiwicks of the Right such as Bahia 
and Sergipe and backing winners in many other states. But how trans-
formational was this turn of events?  
                                                 
9  Not all state elites managed to serve as sole conduits to federal resources. In 
these states (Alagoas, Piauí, Rio Grande do Norte) a few elites competed in a 
polarized fashion, which Borges (2007: 121) calls “oligarchic factionalism.” 
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Transforming Northeastern Politics? 
Gubernatorial victories by the PT’s Wellington Dias in Piauí (2002), 
Jaques Wagner in Bahia (2006), and Marcelo Deda in Sergipe in (2006) 
brought optimism to many analysts and scholars. Trying to make sense 
of this unprecedented shift, some studies argue that the PT’s victories 
were made possible because vertical competition introduced by federal 
social programs had weakened the clientelist networks that monopolized 
access to public goods in order to control voters (Hunter and Power 
2007; Fenwick 2009; Borges 2011; Sugiyama and Hunter 2013; Souza 
2015). They reason that rules-based social programs were resistant to 
local capture and could therefore replace typical linkage strategies used in 
the region. Many hoped, if not anticipated, that the displacement of local 
machines by new incumbents who practiced a unique (for Brazil) style of 
partisanship would solidify programmatic, competitive politics in the 
region. One strand was especially optimistic about these prospects, call-
ing leftist victories a “historic transformation” (Van Dyck and Montero 
2015: 118). 
These studies build on a long-established literature on the history of 
the PT, which emphasizes how electoral success flowed from program-
matic linkages developed by a strongly organized party with deep roots 
in organized civil society (Meneguello 1989; Keck 1992; Amaral 2011; 
Samuels and Zucco 2015). Samuels and Zucco argue that the PT’s 
northeastern success resulted from a center-led growth project that fo-
cused on opening new local party offices (diretórios municipais) to generate 
party identification and electoral support. Furthermore, they contend 
that these local directorates created a robust programmatic identity with 
the PT, which surpassed the initial personal or charismatic connection to 
Lula (Samuels and Zucco 2015: 134).  
In this vein, Van Dyck and Montero (2015: 117) argue that the PT 
succeeded in the Northeast not by mobilizing urban voters as it had 
done in southern Brazil but by creating new constituencies in smaller, 
rural, “conservative-dominated localities” where it previously did not 
have a presence. These local party directorates converted nonmobilized 
poor into new PT partisans. In their account this yielded notable payoffs 
for PT candidates in municipalities where the party opened new direc-
torates: legislative candidates saw an increase of between 2.1 and 4.3 
percent in vote share (Van Dyck and Montero 2015: 132); mayoral can-
didates, 2.9 percent; and governors, 1.3 percent (Van Dyck 2014: 17). 
There are important reasons to question the extent to which party-
building drove the PT’s electoral success in the Northeast. First, despite 
being statistically significant, the magnitude of these findings is small. A 
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2–4 percent increase in vote share might change the electoral fate of a 
legislator, but it is unlikely to affect most executive races. Though the 
vast majority of Brazilian municipalities elect mayors based on the plural-
ity rule, only a small share (15 percent) of mayoral races fell within 3 
percent between 1996 and 2012.10 More importantly, municipal out-
comes were embedded within broader windfall support for the PT’s 
presidential and gubernatorial candidates: Lula had 67 percent of the 
northeastern first-round vote in 2006, while Rousseff amassed 61.6 per-
cent in 2010 and 59.7 percent in 2016. Governors Dias, Wagner, and 
Deda won first-round majorities with a minimum margin of 7 percent 
and secured reelection with an average 30 percent cushion. Even though 
local party offices unquestionably helped to generate some degree of PT 
partisanship in the Northeast, party-building cannot account for the 
sizeable electoral shifts there.  
This account also contradicts the PT’s national-level normalization 
during that time (Amaral 2003, 2010; Samuels 2004; Hunter 2007, 2010; 
Singer 2012). Studies show that the softening of the PT’s ideological 
positions – for example, its embracing of market reforms and macroeco-
nomic stability, its decision to hire marketers to lead professionalized 
campaigns, and especially its openness to electoral alliances with nonleft-
ist parties – preceded Lula’s presidency. The PT made further conces-
sions to pragmatism and governability when it incorporated the catchall 
PMDB into Lula’s cabinet in the aftermath of the mensalão congressional 
bribery scandal in 2005 (Goldfrank and Wampler 2006; Hunter 2007). As 
Rousseff’s 2016 impeachment reiterated, the PMDB is an unreliable, 
splintered amalgamation of regional elites concerned primarily with ac-
cess to federal resources and controlling their home bases. While it has 
not had a viable presidential contender since redemocratization, its large 
legislative bloc makes it a critical source of support in Brazil’s fragment-
ed legislature. Acquiescing to the PMDB by offering ever-larger roles in 
the cabinet was a turning point for the PT in terms of embracing the 
logic of coalitional presidentialism. Its subsequent incorporation of a 
series of smaller nonideological parties on the Right and its orchestration 
of the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrático, PSD) – a 
new support party made up of opposition defectors – further exemplify 
how the PT became increasingly permissive in its alliance choices over 
time. 
                                                 
10  The median margin for all mayoral races in Brazil between 1996 and 2012 is 
11.3 percent (Klašnja and Titiunik 2017: 137). The data for northeastern races 
do not diverge significantly.  
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The need to ensure electoral and legislative support for Lula there-
fore provided the PT with the final push to embrace standard political 
practices in Brazil. This had implications at the national level in terms of 
good governance but also bled into subnational decision-making. Wag-
ner, the future PT governor of Bahia, led President Lula’s Ministry of 
Institutional Relations during this time and advocated strongly for 
broader alliances in Brasília and at the state level. The incorporation of 
existing elites onto PT tickets in states like Bahia and the pragmatic 
abandonment of PT candidacies in most others were direct effects of 
this approach. In contrast to 2002, when the PT boosted Lula’s local 
visibility by fielding a gubernatorial candidate in every state, it scaled 
back candidacies in 2006 to three states, choosing instead to back three 
winners from the leftist Brazilian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Bra-
sileiro, PSB), and helped to swing a second-round election in Maranhão 
by backing the Democratic Labor Party’s (Partido Democrático Tra-
balhista, PDT) Jackson Lago. As the next section will show, the choice 
to back front-runners in the states in exchange for support in Brasília 
would escalate over time, culminating in the PT declaring support for 
many entrenched elites it once fought to displace.  
One should therefore question why a party making ever more con-
cessions to win elections and ensure governability would solely pursue a 
costly and painstaking mobilizational strategy to advance into a region 
dominated by those same useful allies. Fortunately, there are relatively 
easy ways to tell which approach is closer to the truth. For one, the tim-
ing of victories can reveal important information. If party-building is 
behind the PT’s newfound dominance, we would expect consistent and 
relatively gradual growth in electoral returns. Punctuated and volatile 
growth such as a dramatic surge or drop in the number of PT elected 
officials should not follow a gubernatorial win or loss in that state. We 
would also expect that this new partisan support would be somewhat 
evenly spread across the ballot. Municipalities that voted heavily for the 
PT up the ticket should also be supporting mayoral candidates from the 
PT or at least from its historic programmatic allies. Finally, for the trans-
formation to be truly historic, the PT and its allies should be displacing 
incumbents rather than absorbing them. 
As the next section shows, this is not what happened. The PT’s 
growth in the Northeast was abrupt. The party expanded rapidly once it 
held the presidency, especially in states where it also won the governor-
ship. Growing partisanship cannot fully explain this spike, as PT mem-
bership still represents less than 1 percent of the region’s electorate de-
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spite almost doubling between 2002 and 2015.11 Furthermore, voters did 
not reward the PT in isolation; they continued to elect entrenched elites 
at the local and even at the state levels. This does not necessarily indicate 
that they split their support; rather, it highlights that the PT’s success is 
the result of a deliberate strategy to expand locally by tapping the politi-
cal networks of entrenched elites in the center and on the right, either 
directly or through alliances. By choosing to incorporate rather than 
replace these elites, the PT was able to feed and benefit from existing 
networks of clientelistic linkages to local voters. 
Substitution, Not Transformation 
The evidence supports a narrative of overwhelming continuity in north-
eastern politics under the PT. Although some party-building has no 
doubt taken place, the PT’s sustained surge had more to do with its abil-
ity to leverage its prominent position atop the federal government at the 
state and local levels and use federal resources to recruit a large number 
of local elites to join their state-level support coalitions.  
Leveraging Executive Offices for Subnational Gain 
Allegiance to the president has been a fundamental feature of politics in 
the Northeast since redemocratization (figure 1). The 1982 gubernatorial 
elections, the first direct elections in Brazil’s democratic transition, were 
split 12 to 10 between the incumbent promilitary party and the opposi-
tion PMDB. All nine northeastern states sided with the incumbents. 
Four years later, the region abandoned the promilitary party and em-
braced President Sarney’s PMDB and his initially successful economic 
stabilization plan. And while they did not vote for President Collor’s 
personalist-vehicle party in 1990, eight of the region’s nine governors 
provided him with congressional support once in office. Throughout the 
                                                 
11  Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2016. There was a relative partisan build-up in the 
two states that elected a PT governor in 2006 (Bahia and Sergipe), where PT 
membership grew from 0.5 percent of the electorate in 2004 to 0.7 percent in 
2006 compared to states that did not elect one (steady at 0.5 percent). Partisan-
ship levels fell across the board between contests but grew again before the 
2014 election; states that elected a PT governor (Bahia, Ceará, and Piauí) again 
had a greater number of PT members than those who did not (1.1 percent ver-
sus 0.8 percent of the electorate). Surveys from the Brazilian Electoral Panel 
Study (Ames et al. 2013) found greater evidence of partisan support, as 24 per-
cent of northeastern voters indicated a preference for the PT compared to 20 
percent in states outside the region. 
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1990s, states in the Northeast continued to be polarized between the 
PMDB and the conservative PFL,12 even though both parties provided 
the core of President Cardoso’s (of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party 
[Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB]) congressional coalition. 
During this time, it was commonplace for northeastern elites to take 
prominent positions within the federal government and the Congress 
leadership.  
Figure 1. Alignment between Governors and Presidents in the Northeast, 
1982–2014 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the TSE (2016) and Nicolau (n.d.).  
Note: Parties on the Left: PT, PSB, PDT, PC do B. Parties on the Right: PDS, PFL/ 
DEM, PMDB, PSDB, PSC, PSD. (Party breakdowns are available upon re-
quest.)  
Northeastern bosses like Sarney and Magalhães used their ability to 
channel federal resources to municipalities either directly or through 
state governments to ensure compliance from politicians within the state. 
As a result, Magalhães’s PFL controlled an average of 57 percent of 
Bahia’s representatives in the national and state legislatures between 1990 
and 2005 (Alves 2015:127). This allowed him to attract a large number of 
local politicians and their constituencies into his sphere of influence, 
which boosted his reach to over 70 percent of Bahia’s legislators and 
mayors in the late 1990s. Figure 2 illustrates the extent of governismo 
across the Northeast during the second Cardoso administration. Note 
that while Cardoso himself was popular, his party never enjoyed a similar 
standing across the region. Even at his height, the PSDB only had two 
northeastern governors elected and 16 percent of mayors, while Cardo-
                                                 
12  The Liberal Front Party (Partido da Frente Liberal, PFL) splintered from the 
official support party of the military regime and was renamed Democrats 
(DEM) in 2007 (Power n.d.). 
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so’s main allies controlled six states and 53 percent of municipalities.13 
This discrepancy in subnational electoral success indicates that local 
machines provided significant support to the president. The PFL and the 
PMDB continued to polarize state-level disputes in most northeastern 
states during this period, complicating the electoral–governance strategic 
balance for the president. Cardoso therefore eschewed challenging his 
allies’ strongholds, at times abandoning the state-level PSDB to side with 
their opponents.  
Figure 1 demonstrates that Lula’s 2002 election represents a clear 
discontinuity with the northeastern alignment equilibrium. While Lula 
performed strongly in the Northeast, the presidential election required a 
second round to determine the winner. Since it was unclear to local elites 
and voters who the new federal patron would be, only one of the nine 
governors was elected on Lula’s coattails. Disgruntled by a history of 
failed challenges in the states, northeastern PT leaders knew they needed 
to use their party’s presidency to break through. Therefore, Lula ap-
pointed many of them to visible positions within his first cabinet. Within 
the bureaucracy, PT appointees dislodged existing resource routes and 
gave left-led municipalities access to federal programs (Alves 2015). 
Meanwhile, programmatic social policies circumvented governors in 
order to reach poor beneficiaries throughout the region, further loosen-
ing the grip of local clientelistic networks (Borges 2007; Fenwick 2009; 
Zucco 2013, Souza 2015). PT bureaucrats also channeled pork to their 
existing allies through federal voluntary transfers (Johannessen 2016). 
As a result, in the 2006 general elections voters and elites were able 
to resume the regional practice of choosing the president over partisan 
allegiance. In that election the PT saw its sole incumbent governor (Dias 
in Piauí) reelected, added two more (Wagner in Bahia and Deda in Sergi-
pe), and backed two first-round winners in Ceará and Rio Grande do 
Norte. The party also helped turn the tide in two other races (Maranhão 
and Pernambuco) by declaring its support for leftist candidates who 
trailed in the first round. Lula was the driving force of the 2006 elections 
in the Northeast, collecting 66.8 percent of the first-round vote, com-
pared to 48.6 percent nationally. He outdid first-time winners Wagner 
and Deda (53 percent each) and Dias (62 percent). Furthermore, Lula 
won outright in 95 percent of the region’s municipalities, compared to 
just 45 percent in 2002. 
  
                                                 
13  Municipal figures include the Progressive Party (PP). 
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Figure 2. Cardoso’s Coalition Executive Dominance in the Northeast by 
Municipality, 1998 Elections 
 
Note:  Presidential and gubernatorial votes show the share of first-round votes in 
each municipality. Mayoral elections show the municipalities won. Maps for all 
electoral cycles starting in 1998 are available in supplemental materials 
(<https://goo.gl/SgGD4b>). 
Source:  TSE (2016). 
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Campaigns throughout the Northeast featured him prominently – either 
in person or with his face inserted behind local candidates’ banners and 
fliers – with allies proudly touting themselves as “Lula’s candidate.” Lu-
la’s influence proved significant enough to defeat the region’s two fore-
most machines, displacing an incumbent PFL governor in Bahia in the 
first round and using his 75.5 percent support in Maranhão to fuel a 
come-from-behind second-round upset of the Sarney clan. The timing 
and downward push of these results clearly indicate a leveraging dynam-
ic. 
President Lula’s popularity notwithstanding, his ability to anoint his 
presidential successor was facilitated by the Northeast’s willingness to 
line up behind incumbents. Despite having no history of running for 
office, Rousseff garnered 61.6 percent of the first-round vote there, three 
times the amount of her second-round opponent and 15 points better 
than her national vote. To ensure her victory, Lula featured significantly 
in the 2010 campaign, while sitting PT governors Wagner, Dias, and 
Deda led charges in their states. Since then, gubernatorial contests have 
continued to reveal the prominence of alignment over partisanship. 
While the following section will discuss the alliance-making strategy at 
length, it is important to note a qualitative difference in the PT’s electoral 
approach in 2010, when it incorporated the PMDB onto the presidential 
ticket (with Michel Temer as Rousseff’s vice president) and deferred 
from fielding candidates in the majority of northeastern states. The PT 
easily reelected both of its eligible incumbent governors and backed five 
other winners. As a result, the electoral map in 2010 (figure 3) looks 
uncannily similar to that of 1998 (figure 2), save for the party labels: the 
president had an outsize presence in the election, but the penetration of 
the president’s party decreases as the level of analysis shifts downward. 
Nevertheless, states and municipalities side with candidates that are 
aligned with the current president, implying a symbiotic relationship 
between access and support. The number of aligned governors grew in 
2014 despite Rousseff being involved in a closely contested, albeit suc-
cessful, presidential election. Under Rousseff the PT again won the 
Northeast handily, seeing three PT governors elected and backing virtu-
ally all other winners in the region.14  
  
                                                 
14  Although three nonaligned candidates were elected governor in 2014, the PT 
backed two of them in the runoff round. 
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Figure 3. Growing PT Dominance in Executive Vote in the Northeast by 
Municipality, 2010 
 
Note:  Presidential and gubernatorial votes show the share of first-round votes in 
each municipality. Mayoral elections show the municipalities won.  
Source:  TSE (2016). 
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The final step in executive alignment is the repositioning of mayors. 
Municipal elections have been held as midterm elections between general 
elections since 1996, reflecting the current state of both presidential and 
gubernatorial power. The line in figure 4 illustrates the effect of the pres-
idency on the PT’s achievements in mayoral elections in the region. The 
PT accounted for only 1.2 percent of northeastern mayors as late as the 
2000 election despite being competitive at the national level since 1989. 
Lula’s rise to the presidency preceded a steady period of expansion of PT 
municipal governments, which started with the tripling of PT mayors in 
the 2004 elections. But the politics of governors weathers presidential 
impact. The PT’s advances into local governments occurred at a much 
faster rate in the states where it also controlled the governorship, which 
peaked at one in five. This likely represents both supply and demand 
logic. Controlling both federal and state executives allows incumbent 
parties to more easily distribute resources to allies. It also likely denotes 
strategic actions on the part of mayors lining up to bend the knee. The 
punctuated increase in the number of PT mayors in states with PT gov-
ernors has less to do with party-building, which is a protracted process, 
and likely more to do with the electoral benefits of leveraging executive 
positions at higher levels of government. The dramatic drop in PT 
mayors across the board in 2016 – in the immediate aftermath of 
Rousseff’s impeachment – further indicates that voters and mayors pivot 
in response to changes in Brasília and the state capitals.  
Figure 4. PT’s Share of Mayors by Relationship to Governor in the North-
east, 2000–2016 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on data from the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (2016). 
Expanding Coalitions 
Stitching together broad, pragmatic alliances is the other essential com-
ponent of electoral and governing success in Brazil. Historically, north-
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eastern elites mastered the ability to build coalitions that eschewed ideol-
ogy in order to stay on top. PT candidates did not substitute them at the 
state level until they chose to emulate this behavior (Hunter 2010; Ribei-
ro 2014), becoming increasingly adept at it as payoffs from their first 
concessions came in.  
Decisions to enter alliances of convenience took different forms 
depending on the local patterns of competition and access to national-
level support. Where opposition elites were splintered, the PT took a 
leadership role and co-opted them in order to jointly displace the domi-
nant group (e.g., Bahia, Piauí, and Sergipe). In most other cases, where 
amenable elites had significant power bases that could be useful at the 
national level, the PT deferred, choosing to serve as the junior member 
locally. Some of these instances led to ideologically consistent alliances, 
such as the multiple times it teamed up with the center-left PSB. But this 
strategy eventually led to dramatic about-faces, such as embracing the 
Sarney clan in Maranhão to the detriment of other leftist candidates. In 
these instances, the PT refueled the ailing networks of former oppo-
nents, reinvigorating their political prominence in return for support.  
Ruling elites in the Northeast were keen coalition-builders. The av-
erage governor’s electoral coalition between 1998 and 2014 contained 
eight parties, with even larger governing coalitions enabling leaders to 
enlist local support. Although national-level positions were typically held 
by members of the governor’s party or a key ally, coalition partners 
played a larger role in the composition of state legislatures and especially 
in municipal governments. The average northeastern governor’s party 
accounted for 29 percent of mayors in 2002, while allies accounted for 
35 percent. In extreme cases, alliance partners controlled up to 60 per-
cent of municipalities. Figures 2 and 3 also hint at the territorial logic of 
alliance-making, as they spread fairly evenly throughout the states. This 
suggests that state-level elites selectively compensated local politicians 
who could serve as brokers across the territory. 
Historically, the PT played the role of ideologically consistent oppo-
sition by refusing to join nonleftist electoral coalitions.15 As late as the 
1998 elections – when Cardoso won reelection by defeating Lula – the 
party still emphasized ideological coherence when building alliances. 
Seven out of the PT’s nine gubernatorial coalitions in that election con-
sisted only of leftist parties. Ideological consistency brought about steady 
defeats in the region, where it lost eight out of nine contests. Following 
                                                 
15  There are a few exceptions where opposition groups united in order to chal-
lenge local machines, but the PT was not the key player in any of them.  
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the party’s national-level decision to soften its stance for the 2002 elec-
tions, the PT showed a greater willingness to allow smaller parties to join 
their state-level coalitions. In fact, its only successful candidate – Dias in 
Piauí – led an alliance composed of seven parties from across the politi-
cal spectrum. The PT leadership has loosened the belt significantly since, 
with the party’s average coalition size growing from around 5 parties in 
2002 to 11 parties in 2014. Concurrently, the PT’s average municipal 
coalition size grew from less than two in 2000 to over five in 2012 
(Dunning and Novaes forthcoming). 
Scholars have noted that the incorporation of the catchall PMDB 
into the Lula’s cabinet marked a turning point for the party nationally 
(e.g., Hunter 2007). This move also greatly subsidized the PT’s subna-
tional expansion. Local PMDB elites played a pivotal role in the PT’s 
gubernatorial beachhead victory in Piauí, where two-term governor 
Francisco “Mão Santa” Souza campaigned for Dias in interior municipal-
ities where the PT did not have an organizational presence (Sandes-
Freitas 2016). Likewise, Wagner’s 2006 victory in Bahia followed a pact 
in which the PMDB’s leader, Geddel Vieira Lima, traded his own candi-
dacy for the right to name the vice governor on the PT ticket and a posi-
tion in Lula’s cabinet. Wagner’s broad coalition allowed him to polarize 
the election between the PT and the incumbent PFL governor Paulo 
Souto, pitting Lula’s popularity against the governor’s identification with 
Cardoso’s PSDB. While the PMDB also played a smaller role in Deda’s 
victories in Sergipe, the alliance’s most flagrant union occurred in Mara-
nhão, when the PT formally backed Roseana Sarney’s reelection bid in 
2010. As part of the national deal between her father – former president 
José Sarney – and President Lula, Roseana Sarney campaigned with Lula 
in 2006 despite being a PFL candidate and then switched to the PMDB 
in 2010 in order to formalize their alliance. Despite substantive protests 
from party founders in that state – including a nationally covered hunger 
strike in Congress – the PT National Committee overruled the local 
chapter and allowed a joint PMDB–PT Sarney candidacy. Alexandre 
Padilha, then Lula’s minister of institutional relations, justified the deci-
sion, saying that “Roseana opens up our reach and fully embraces Dil-
ma’s candidacy. It is an important platform of 2 to 2.5 million votes” 
(Globo.com 2010). 
In return for their support, the PMDB and other allies were able to 
negotiate cabinet positions in PT administrations in Brasília and in vari-
ous states. Of note was the top job in the Ministry of National Integra-
tion, a small but relevant office for northeastern states due to its control 
over water infrastructure, drought relief, and regional development pro-
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grams, among others. Northeastern appointees ran this ministry for all 
but the last year of PT administrations, starting with Ceará’s Ciro Gomes 
and followed by Bahia’s Geddel Vieira Lima, appointees by Pernambu-
co’s Eduardo Campos, and once again Gomes during Rousseff’s tenure. 
The PMDB in the Northeast continued to benefit from the allocation of 
positions in federal ministries. For instance, Sarney appointees held the 
position of minister of mines and energy for 10 of the PT’s 13 years in 
the presidency despite his first pick having to resign in 2007 amidst cor-
ruption allegations (Folha de São Paulo 2007). Those who joined the alli-
ance at later stages also benefited from state and national cabinet posi-
tions. 
Moreover, allied parties such as the PMDB earned immediate elec-
toral dividends in subsequent municipal elections. While the number of 
PT mayors increased from 1 percent in 2000 to 10 percent in 2012 dur-
ing the PT’s time in power, this share remained well below those of its 
main regional allies, which accounted for 36 percent of mayors in 2008 
and 45 percent in 2012 (table 2). Before joining the PT, the PMDB had 
been experiencing a steady decline in their share of mayors, losing one-
quarter of the municipalities they controlled in the 2004 polls. This loss 
was promptly recovered at the 2008 municipal election following its 
alliance with the PT. The PMDB’s resurgence was evidenced by a 143 
percent increase in mayoral victories in the four states in which it had 
joined the PT in electoral coalitions, though it continued to lose ground 
in other states. It is unlikely that this rapid and concentrated reversal in 
fortune exemplifies changes in partisan preferences; rather, it fits within 
the broader trend that local voters favor mayors in federal and state 
governing coalitions. In addition, it also shows that local politicians and 
voters were not attached to the PT itself, as the proponents of the party-
building thesis would lead us to believe. Even though the PT ran more 
candidates at the local level than ever before, the electorate continued to 
support preexisting local elites, albeit now under the PT’s tutelage. A 
telling statistic is that while the number of mayors in PT-associated par-
ties expanded greatly at the 2012 elections, their local-level success clus-
tered in those states where they held alliances with the PT. Only 48 per-
cent of the mayors belonging to the four parties in state-level alliances 
with the PT in 2004 resided in those states where alliances were forged. 
By 2012, the PT had 19 different state-level allies, but 64 percent of 
allied mayors were housed in the states where they were tied to the PT. 
This implies a codependent relationship in which the PT attached itself 
to local frontrunners to boost its standing in the states, and local elites 
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could only be successful by tapping into the PT’s nationally controlled 
resources. 
Table 2.  Share of Mayors and Party-Switching Mayors by Alliance in the 
Northeast, 2000–2012 
 Share of Mayors  
Share of Mayors Who 
Switched Parties 
 2000 2004 2008 2012  2000 2004 2008 2012
PSDB All. 39 29 21 16 57 25 11 6
PSDB 16 13 11 7 22 18 6 3
Allies 23 16 10 9 35 7 5 3
PT All. 6 9 43 55 1 7 54 59
PT 1 4 8 10 - 1 3 4
Allies 4 6 36 45 1 5 51 55
All Other  55 61 36 28 42 68 35 35
N 1787 1792 1791 1793 269 214 433 255
Note:  Shaded cells represent national incumbency.  
Source:  Author’s calculation based on data from the TSE (2016). 
Furthermore, a close analysis of the mayors bulking up the PT’s alliances 
in the Northeast reveals that party-switching is not the privilege of major 
state-level elites like the Sarneys and Gomeses. While a portion of the 
alliance gains are due to parties joining the coalition, a significant part 
comes from local elites switching parties to avoid the unsavory role of 
local opposition. On average, about 16 percent of mayors elected in the 
Northeast have previously held the same position under a different party. 
This pattern of party-switching correlates with national- and state-level 
incumbency. Following Cardoso’s reelection in 1998, 57 percent of 
mayors who switched parties joined the PSDB and state-level allies. As 
we have seen, the 2004 municipal election occurred during an atypical 
period in which most governors were not aligned with the PT president 
– hence the majority of opportunist mayors switching to nonaligned 
parties. By 2008, the PT had become the preeminent force in the nation 
and, through alliances, in most states. Opportunist local elites therefore 
jumped on the PT alliance bandwagon. The PT’s strong organization 
typically served as a barrier to entry to the party, which explains the rela-
tively large migration to PT allies. Party-switchers therefore accounted 
for a substantive portion of the PT alliance’s gains in 2008 (11 percent of 
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the PT’s mayors and over 35 percent of the alliance’s).16 Interestingly, 73 
percent of party-switching mayors changed loyalties while running for 
reelection in 2008, revealing a clear attempt to maximize the benefits of 
incumbency at the federal, state, and local levels. In the extreme case of 
Bahia 70 percent of the newly elected mayors in the alliance had been 
members of the Magalhães coalition.  
The bottom line is that by looking at the PT’s electoral growth out-
side of its regional context, we risk overestimating the degree of change 
that has occurred. Voters rewarded allied parties in far greater numbers, 
and many of those electoral gains were actually the same candidates 
winning under new labels. This means that the PT did not vanquish old 
elites but merely allowed opportunists to continue to line up behind 
incumbents in order to go on with business as usual.  
Conclusion 
Leftist government has lost its shine across Latin America, as rightist 
politicians have taken advantage of political and economic crises to re-
claim power through the ballot box or congressional maneuvering. The 
PT is an example of a party that has experienced the apparent phenome-
non of inevitable rise and quick decline. The hope that the PT and other 
pink-tide governments would focus on social justice seems to have come 
to fruition based on human development indicators and the Right’s ini-
tial refusal to directly abandon redistributive policies where it reclaimed 
power (Niedzwiecki and Pribble 2017). However, the expectation that 
these parties would deepen democracy by using programmatic competi-
tion and governance to change political practices has not been entirely 
met. Rather, the PT’s experiences in Brasília and in the northeastern 
states show that even an internally coherent and mobilized party that 
wishes to spread in unequal settings must adapt its linkage strategies in 
order to succeed. In the PT’s case this meant learning to leverage execu-
tive power at higher levels of government to spread into lower levels. 
The need for national-level support – heightened by corruption scandals 
– along with the lack of partisan networks of their own meant that the 
PT had to loosen the standards on which it based alliances. The PT’s 
segmented strategy paid rapid dividends, with the party needing only one 
full electoral cycle to force a realignment of northeastern governors and 
                                                 
16  This evidence is corroborated by Dunning and Novaes (forthcoming), who 
show that 30 percent of PT mayoral candidates in 2008 had previously been in 
other parties. 
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the politicians in their cadres. But this method led to a tenuous rather 
than a deeply rooted hold on power,17 allowing opportunists to raise the 
costs of coalition maintenance until presidentialism became less about 
building programmatic coalitions to govern and more about joint co-
optation. 
What lessons can be learned from this account? First, while tempt-
ing, using the presidency to fuel subnational expansion is likely to have 
little more than a fleeting impact. In the aftermath of Rousseff’s im-
peachment, the PT lost over half of the municipalities it controlled. 
However, given the nature of incumbent politics, governors can play a 
significant role in counteracting this trend. For instance, the decrease in 
PT mayors was significantly lower in the Northeast because the PT’s 
three northeastern governors were able to limit the impact of Rousseff’s 
demise in their states by having tied down opportunistic parties with 
resources and cabinet positions. Conversely, the majority of municipal 
losses came in states where the PT had allied governors, who are quicker 
to turn when the enticements that attracted them run dry. This illustrates 
how opportunist allies respond not to message but to access.  
The PT’s foray into the Northeast also speaks to the impacts of par-
ty adaption to the party system more broadly. As Roberts (2014) shows, 
leftist parties that adopt rightist policy preferences in order to win or 
survive in office uproot existing voter linkages, unmoor historical parties, 
and, ultimately, dealign party systems and electoral competition. In Rob-
erts’ account the PT channeled a popular backlash to neoliberal reforms 
and, in doing so, contributed to programmatic alignment and party sys-
tem institutionalization in Brazil. However, the PT’s move toward the 
center and acceptance of some precepts of the Washington Consensus 
might have belatedly introduced the seeds of dealignment in Brazilian 
politics, as evidenced by the severe contraction of the PFL/DEM and, to 
a lesser extent, the PSDB. In its subsequent adoption of conservative 
electoral methods the PT might have revealed a secondary potential 
source of party system dealignment, hindering not only its distinctive 
brand and potentially undercutting its redistributive legacy but also ulti-
mately discrediting the Left more broadly. The resulting crisis of repre-
sentation fed a wave of social protests and opened the door to populist 
and outsider forces (Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010), such as Jair 
Bolsonaro and João Doria. In response to a question about corruption in 
the PT, Jaques Wagner once said that those who have never tried molas-
                                                 
17  Dunning and Novaes (forthcoming) reach a similar set of conclusions. 
  The Workers’ Party and the Right in Northeast Brazil 125
 

 
ses inevitably get messy when they do.18 By indulging in the benefits and 
practices of the Brazilian political system, the PT might have broken the 
two main structures that, though flawed, have kept Brazil relatively stable 
since redemocratization: the party system and coalitional presidentialism.  
The paradox, therefore, is that subnational expansion in unequal 
settings requires linkage segmentation, but the act of segmenting can 
paint a party into a corner. By making increasingly pragmatic choices in 
the Northeast, the PT abandoned its transformational project, at times 
creating new entrenched elites or sponsoring the deep-rooted machines 
they once fiercely contested. Today, the PT’s power base is more con-
centrated in the Northeast than ever before, especially in those states 
where it holds the governorship. But as rightist parties’ recent history 
shows, this power base is highly dependent on who controls the federal 
spigot. It is too soon to know for certain whether the PT has trans-
formed the typical elite–voter linkages in the Northeast or whether the 
region will return to its previous status quo and banish the PT. It is cer-
tainly plausible that the PT’s apparent demise is itself evidence that 
northeastern voters have broken the pattern and will now punish politics 
as usual under all banners. If the argument presented here is correct, the 
PT’s losses will be significant, irrespective of President Temer’s abysmal 
approval ratings. As hard as it was to envision at the time of writing this 
paper, if Temer’s position is strengthened in 2018, old elites with federal 
contacts will reassert themselves, the PT will lose states, and its munici-
pal showing will thus decline even further.19 But if the national situation 
remains unclear, the power of incumbency will allow PT governors to 
influence subnational elites to hold on. Lula’s popularity in the Northeast 
– as exemplified by his recent trek through the region – might provide 
the PT with enough support to reclaim the presidency; however, his 
position as the PT’s sole viable candidate directly confronts the claim 
that voting in the Northeast is based on stable, programmatic partisan 
linkages rather than charismatic or clientelistic ones.  
                                                 
18  “Quem nunca comeu melado, quando come, se lambuza.” (Folha 2016b).  
19  In line with this argument the local press recently speculated that Bahia’s Gov-
ernor Rui Costa (PT) cut a deal to influence the 2 August 2017 vote on whether 
to authorize corruption investigations against President Temer by temporarily 
releasing two of his cabinet members so that they could resume seats in the na-
tional chamber to abstain from the vote, favoring the president. This ultimately 
did not occur, but the underlying logic was that Temer’s demise would bring 
the DEM’s Rodrigo Maia to the presidency, therefore aligning the party of the 
would-be president and Costa’s main political opponent, the mayor of Salvador 
(ACM Neto, also DEM) (A Tarde 2017). 
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Transformação ou Substituição? O Partido dos Trabalhadores e a 
Direita no Nordeste do Brasil 
Resumo: Os avanços obtidos pelo Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) e 
outros partidos da esquerda nos governos estaduais e municipais na 
região Nordeste são uma das principais mudanças na política brasileira 
recente. Uma literatura importante propõe que este fenômeno é resulta-
do de uma estratégia transformativa, ancorada num crescimento institu-
cional baseado na abertura de diretórios municipais. Em discordância, 
esta análise mostra que os ganhos do PT na região são frutos de uma 
segmentação de estratégias, na qual o partido obteve sucesso ao incorpo-
rar práticas regionais preestabelecidas. Primeiro, o PT alavancou o con-
trole do poder executivo para avançar nos níveis inferiores (do governo 
federal aos estaduais e daí aos municipais). Segundo, o partido construiu 
alianças pragmáticas com partidos oportunistas. O foco nestas alianças 
revela como a migração de políticos oportunistas para partidos aliados 
permitiu que os mesmos se mantivessem no poder. Isto sugere que os 
avanços subnacionais da esquerda não são tão transformativos quanto 
parecem e podem ter efeitos negativos na consolidação democrática. 
Palavras chave: Brasil; eleições estaduais; eleições municipais; partidos 
políticos; política subnacional 
 
